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WARRANTIES-UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-EFFECTS OF FEDERAL
WARRANTY LAW ON WASHINGTON U.C.C. PROVIsINs-Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (Supp. V 1975).
In recent months the warranty documents accompanying consumer
products have begun to incorporate new terminology and describe
new warranty procedures. These changes are the result of the first fed-
eral legislation in the consumer product warranty field-the Magnu-
son-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act
(Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act).1 On December 31, 1976, the rules
necessary for implementation of the Act became fully operative.2
Consumer product warranties-their creation, breach, and reme-
dies upon breach-have generally been controlled by the common
law and Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) provisions in each state.
Washington is no exception, and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
should have a significant impact upon the traditional warranty law of
this jurisdiction. This note will briefly discuss the Act's basic require-
ments and then consider the impact of several of the Act's major pro-
visions upon similar or conflicting provisions of the Washington Uni-
form Commercial Code.3 Primary emphasis will be placed upon the
Act's effects regarding the doctrine of privity, disclaimer of implied
warranties, limitation on remedies and consequential damages, and
the creation of a federal cause of action for breach of warranty. Non-
conflicting provisions of the Act which add significantly to Wash-
ington law will also be noted.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975). Title I, dealing with consumer
product warranties, is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (Supp. V 1975). Title II,
dealing with the jurisdiction and powers of the Federal Trade Commission, is codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 45-46, 49-50, 52, 56-57 (Supp. V 1975), and is not dealt with in this
note.
2. The effective date of most of the Act was July 4, 1975. See Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act § 112(a), 15 U.S.C. §
2312(a) (Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter cited as Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act]. Sec-
tion 112 became effective on December 31, 1976, one year after the final publication
of implementation rules for that section. See id. § 112(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2312(b); Fed-
eral Trade Commission, Rules, Regulations, Statements and Interpretations Under
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 40 Fed. Reg. 60,167, 60,190 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Magnuson-Moss Statements]. The Federal Trade Commission has indicated
that it intends the implementation rules made final on December 31, 1976 to apply
only to products manufactured thereafter. See 41 Fed. Reg. 34,657 (1976)(proposing
16 C.F.R. § 700.12).
3. The scope of this note is limited to the effects of the Act on Washington war-
ranty law. For further discussion of the Act, see Clark & Davis, Beefing Up Product
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The note concludes that the Act is highly technical and not without
ambiguities which will remain a source of frustration for both pur-
chasers and sellers of consumer products. Nonetheless, it is hoped that
recognition of the Act's interaction with state law will aid Washington
citizens in fully utilizing its beneficial provisions.
I. THE ACT AND ITS UNDERLYING PROBLEMS
A. Basic Provisions
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act was promulgated in order to
increase consumer understanding of product warranties and the rights
accompanying such warranties, as well as to provide assurances that
such rights could be enjoyed.4 Although the Act is primarily a war-
ranty labeling and disclosure law, its provisions make substantive
changes in state law regarding warranties, their disclaimer, and causes
of action for breach of warranty. Additionally, the Act establishes the
possibility of informal dispute settlement mechanisms for warranty
problem solution. 5
The Act provides that any "warrantor ' 6 who gives a "written war-
Warranties: A New Dimension in Consumer Protection, 23 KAN. L. REv. 567 (1975);
Denicola, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Making Consumer Product Warranty
a Federal Case, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 273 (1975); Leete, A Look at the Consumer
Warranty Problem---The Federal Solution, 6 U. TOL. L. REV. 35 (1975); Rothschild.
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Does It Balance Warrantor and Consumer In-
terests? 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 335 (1976); Saxe & Blejwas. The Federal Warranty
Act: Progress and Pitfalls, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1 (1976); Schmitt & Kovac.
Magnuson-Moss vs. State Protective Consumer Legislation: The Validity of a Stricter
State Standard of Warranty Protection, 30 ARK. L. REV. 21 (1976); Shaw, Magnuson-
Moss Warrant--Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 17 S. TEx. L.J. 229
(1976); Squillante. The New Federal Warranty Disclosure Standards for Written
Warranties of Consumner Products (pts. 1-3), 80 COM. LJ. 477. 516. 81 CoM. L.J.
54 (1975-76); Strasser. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: An Overview and Compari-
son with UCC Coverage, Disclaimer, and Remedies in Consumer Warranties, 27
MERCER L. REV. 1111 (1976); 51 IND. L.J. 397 (1976); 9J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 887
(1976); 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 775 (1976); 7 RUT.-CAM. LJ. 379 (1976); 49 TEMP.
L.Q. 459 (1976); 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163 (1976).
4. 120 CONG. REC. S21,976 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Moss).
5. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § l10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 23 10(a) (Supp. V 1975);
16 C.F.R. § 703 (1976). Discussion of the dispute settlement mechanisms is beyond
the scope of this note. See Rothschild, supra note 3, at 368-77, and other sources
cited note 3 supra.
6. The Act defines "warrantor" as "any supplier or other person who gives or
offers to give a written warranty or who is or may be obligated under an implied
warranty." Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 101(5), 15 U.S.C. § 2301(5) (Supp. V
1975). This definition was modified for certain purposes by the final implementing rules
under the Act. See note 60 infra.
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ranty' '7 must include certain information as outlined in the Act8 and
specifically prescribed by the rules promulgated thereunder.9 The Act
7. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 101(6), 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (Supp. V 1975)
provides:
The term "written warranty" means-
(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection
with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates
to the nature of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises that
such material or workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level of
performance over a specified period of time, or
(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of
a consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action
with respect to such product in the event that such product fails to meet the
specifications set forth in the undertaking,
which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking becomes part of the basis
of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale
of such product.
8. Id. § 102(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) provides:
(a) In order to improve the adequacy of information available to consumers,
prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer
products, any warrantor warranting a consumer product to a consumer by
means of a written' warranty shall, to the extent required by rules of the
Commission, fully and conspicuously disclose in simple and readily under-
stood language the terms and conditions of such warranty. Such rules may
require inclusion in the written warranty of any of the following items
among others:
(1) The clear identification of the names and addresses of the warrantors.
(2) The identity of the party or parties to whom the warranty is extended.
(3) The products or parts covered.
(4) A statement of what the warrantor will do in the event of a defect, mal-
function, or failure to conform with such written warranty-at whose ex-
pense-and for what period of time.
(5) A statement of what the consumer must do and expenses he must bear.
(6) Exceptions and exclusions from the terms of the warranty.
(7) The step-by-step procedure which the consumer should take in order to
obtain performance of any obligation under the warranty, including the iden-.
tification of any person or class of persons authorized to perform the obliga-
tions set forth in the warranty.
(8) Information respecting the availability of any informal dispute settlement
procedure offered by the warrantor and a recital, where the warranty so pro-
vides, that the purchaser may be required to resort to such procedure before
pursuing any legal remedies in the courts.
(9) A brief, general description of the legal remedies available to the con-
sumer.
(10) The time at which the warrantor will perform any obligations under
the warranty.
(11) The period of time within which, after notice of a defect, malfunction,
or failure to conform with the warranty, the warrantor will perform any ob-
ligations under the warranty.
(12) The characteristics or properties of the products, or parts thereof, that
are not covered by the warranty.
(13) The elements of the warranty in words or phrases which would not mis-
lead a reasonable, average consumer as to the nature or scope of the war-
ranty.
9. The implementing rule varied the Act's requirements:
(a) Any warrantor warranting to a consumer by means of a written warranty
a consumer product actually costing the consumer more than $15.00 shall clearly
397
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does not require, however, that written warranties be given with con-
sumer products.1 0
and conspicuously disclose in a single document in simple and readily under-
stood language, the following items of information: (1) The identity of the party
or parties to whom the written warranty is extended, if the enforceability of the
written warranty is limited to the original consumer purchaser or is otherwise
limited to persons other than every consumer owner during the term of the war-
ranty;
(2) A clear description and identification of products, or parts, or character-
istics or components or properties covered by and where necessary for clarifica-
tion. excluded from the warranty;
(3) A statement of what the warrantor will do in the event of a defect, mal-
function or failure to conform with the written warranty. including the items or
services the warrantor will pay for or provide, and where necessary for clarifica-
tion, those which the warrantor will not pay for or provide:
(4) The point in time or event on which the warranty term commences. if
different from the purchase date, and the time period or other measurement of
warranty duration;
(5) A step-by-step explanation of the procedure which the consumer should
follow in order to obtain performance of any warranty obligation, including the
persons or class of persons authorized to perform warranty obligations. This in-
cludes the name(s) of the warrantor(s), together with: the mailing address(es)
of the warrantor(s), and/or the name or title and the address of any employee or
department of the warrantor responsible for the performance of warranty obli-
gations, and/or a telephone number which consumers may use without charge
to obtain information on warranty performance;
(6) Information respecting the availability of any informal dispute settlement
mechanism elected by the warrantor in compliance with Part 703 of this sub-
chapter;
(7) Any limitations on the duration of implied warranties. disclosed on the
face of the warranty as provided in Section 108 of the Act. accompanied by the
following statement:
Some states do not allow limitations on how long an implied warranty lasts.
so the above limitation may not apply to you.
(8) Any exclusions of or limitations on relief such as incidental or consequen-
tial damages accompanied by the following statement, which may be combined
with the statement required in sub-paragraph (7) above:
Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of incidental or conse-
quential damages, so the above limitation or exclusion may not apply to you.
(9) A statement in the following language:
This warranty gives you specific legal rights, and you may also have other
rights which vary from state to state.
(b) Paragraph (a)(l)-(9) of this Section shall not be applicable with re-
spect to statements of general policy on emblems, seals or insignias issued by
third parties promising replacement or refund if a consumer product is defective.
which statements contain no representation or assurance of the quality or per-
formance characteristics of the product; provided that (I) the disclosures re-
quired by paragraph (a)(1)-(9) are published by such third parties in each
issue of a publication with a general circulation, and (2) such disclosures are
provided free of charge to any consumer upon written request.
16 C.F.R. § 701.3 (1976).
10. The Act states: "Nothing in this title (other than paragraph (3) of this sub-
section) shall be deemed to authorize the Commission to prescribe the duration of
written warranties given or to require that a consumer product or any of its com-
ponents be warranted." Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 102(b)(2). 15 U.S.C. §
2302(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
"Consumer product" is defined by the Act as "any tangible personal property which
398
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B. Designation of Warranties
The designation-of-warranty provisions are the requirements of the
Act that will be most apparent to consumers. Every written warranty
of a consumer product costing more than ten dollars must "clearly
and conspicuously" designate whether it is "full" or "limited."" The
respective categories provide different degrees of warranty informa-
tion to consumers and differ in their impact on state law.
A "full" warranty is one which meets criteria termed "Federal min-
imum standards for warranty."'1 2 In addition to the general disclosure
requirements of the Act,' 3 the federal minimum standards require,
inter alia, that a "full" warrantor must, as a minimum, "remedy" a
defective product within a reasonable time and without charge. 14 Such
a "full" warranty cannot impose any limitation on the duration of an
is distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or house-
hold purposes (including any such property intended to be attached to or installed in
any real property without regard to whether it is so attached or installed)." Id. §
101(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1). The definition of the term in two of the implementing
rules adds the following: "[p] roducts which are purchased solely for commercial or
industrial use are excluded solely for purposes of this Part." 16 C.F.R. §§ 701.1(b),
702.1(b) (1976). A proposed implementation rule of the Federal Trade Commission
explains the scope of the term in detail. See 41 Fed. Reg. 34,654-55 (1976) (pro-
posing 16 C.F.R. § 700.1).
11. The Act provides:
(a) Any warrantor warranting a consumer product by means of a written war-
ranty shall clearly and conspicuously designate such warranty in the following
manner, unless exempted from doing so by the Commission pursuant to sub-
section (c) of this section:
(1) If the written warranty meets the Federal minimum standards for warranty
set forth in section 104 of this Act, then it shall be conspicuously desig-
nated a "full (statement of duration) warranty."
(2) If the written warranty does not meet the Federal minimum standards for
warranty set forth in section 104 of this Act, then it shall be conspicu-
ously designated a "limited warranty."
(b) Sections 102, 103, and 104 shall not apply to statements or representations
which are similar to expressions of general policy concerning customer satis-
faction and which are not subject to any specific limitations.
(c) In addition to exercising the authority pertaining to disclosure granted in
section 102 of this Act, the Commission may by rule determine when a written
warranty does not have to be designated either "full (statement of duration)"
or "limited" in accordance with this section.
(d) The provisions of subsections (a) and (c) of this section apply only to
warranties which pertain to consumer products actually costing the consumer
more than $10 and which are not designated "full (statement of duration) war-
ranties."
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 103, 15 U.S.C. § 2303 (Supp. V 1975).
12. Id. § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 2304.
13. See id. § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 2302; 16 C.F.R. § 701.3 (1976), quoted at note 9
supra.
14. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 104(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1) (Supp.
V 1975). "Remedy" is defined by the Act as follows:
399
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implied warranty,15 nor can it impose any duty on the consumer
(other than that of notifying the warrantor of a defect) without prior
demonstration to the Federal Trade Commission that the duty is rea-
sonable.16 In addition, a "full" warranty cannot exclude or limit con-
sequential damages without conspicuously disclosing that fact on the
face of the warranty.1 7 The "full" warranty provisions also provide
that the duties extend to each person who is a consumer with regard
to the warranted product.18 In contrast, a "limited" warranty is any
written warranty that does not meet the federal minimum standards;' 9
nevertheless it remains subject to the provisions of the Act and its
implementing rules.
C. Implementation Rules
The Act relies extensively on rules promulgated by the Federal
Trade Commission for its implementation. References to these rules,
most of which the Commission is not required to promulgate, appear
at various places in the Act and pertain to a variety of warranty mat-
ters.20 For persons utilizing the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the
rules are as important as the statute itself; they provide the specific
The term "remedy" means whichever of the following actions the warrantor
elects:
(A) repair.
(B) replacement, or
(C) refund;
except that the warrantor may not elect refund unless (i) the warrantor is un-
able to provide replacement and repair is not commercially practicable or cannot
be timely made, or (ii) the consumer is willing to accept such refund.
Id. § 101(10), 15 U.S.C. § 2301(10). The definition in the implementing rule is
effectively identical. See 16 C.F.R. § 701.1(e)(1976).
15. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 104(a)(2). 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (Supp.
V 1975). Such a durational limitation is otherwise allowed in the case of "limited"
warranties under § 108(b). See note 83 and accompanying text infra.
16. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 104(b)(1). 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(1) (Supp.
V 1975).
17. Id. § 104(a)(3). 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3).
18. Id. § 104(b)(4). 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(4).
19. Id. § 103(a)(2). 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a)(2), quoted at note I I supra.
20. The following provisions of the Act are "optional" in that they do not re-
quire the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to promulgate implementing rules: Mag-
nuson-Moss Warranty Act § 101(12), 15 U.S.C. § 2301(12) (Supp. V 1975) (use of
depreciation in determining refunds), but see 41 Fed. Reg. 22,099 (1976) (proposing
16 C.F.R. § 704); Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 102(b)(l)(B), 15 U.S.C. §
2302(b)(l)(B) (Supp. V 1975) (manner of warranty display); id. § 102(b)(3), 15
U.S.C. § 2302(b)(3) (extension of warranty period by failure to repair); id. § 102(d).
15 U.S.C. § 2302(d) (standard provisions for incorporation by reference); id. § 103,
15 U.S.C. § 2303 (exemption from "full" or "limited" designation requirement); id.
400
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warranty requirements, 2 ' establish remedies, 22 and even change some
substantive provisions of the Act. 23 Although the rules are the main
source of information for implementation of the Act, they are also a
source of confusion due to inconsistencies with statutory language and
inconsistencies within the rules themselves.24
D. The Effects of the Act on State Law
A significant problem with the Act is the degree to which it pre-
cludes state law.25 The Act does not specifically mention preemption
§ 104(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4) (determining what constitutes a reasonable
number of repair attempts); id. § 104(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(2) (exemption
to requirement that products be returned clear of liens); id. § 104(b)(3), 15 U.S.C.
§ 2304(b)(3) (detailed duties of "full" warrantor); id. § 106(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2306(a)
(service contraqt conditions).
The following provisions require promulgation on the part of the FTC: id. § 102(a),
15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (written warranty provisions), see 16 C.F.R. § 701 (1976);
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 102(b)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(A) (Supp.
V 1975) (pre-sale availability of warranty provisions), see 16 C.F.R. § 702 (1976);
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § (109(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2309(b)(Supp. V 1975) (used
automobile warranties), see 41 Fed. Reg. 1089, 20,896 (1976) (proposing 16 C.F.R.
§ 455); Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 110(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2)(Supp.
V 1975) (informal dispute settlement mechanisms), see 16 C.F.R. § 703 (1976).
21. 16C.F.R. § 701 (1976).
22. Id. § 703.
23. Certain of the implementing rules greatly alter the Act. For example,
section 102(e) of the Act provides that the labeling provisions of that section apply
only to products costing more than $5. In contrast, rules in 16 C.F.R. §§ 701.2,
702.3 (1976) provide that the labeling provisions shall apply only to products cost-
ing more than $15. The question of authority to make this change apparently both-
ered the Federal Trade Commission, which used four columns of its- explanatory
statement to justify the change. See Magnuson-Moss Statements, supra note 2, at
60,171-72 (1975).
24. In circumstances to which the rules cited in note 23 supra apply, for example,
the rules apparently do not affect the designation requirements of section 102 of the
Act, with the result that a written warranty must be designated "full" or "limited"
when the product costs more than $10, but need not fulfill the warranty provisions
of the Act and implementing rules unless the product costs more than $15. This re-
sult is somewhat anomalous and not consistent with the original distinction of the
Act: disclosure required on products more than $5, labeling required on products
costing more than $10. Requiring a warrantor to label a product warranty with the
Act's terms of art, yet not requiring disclosure of the warranty terms, does not seem
to benefit consumers. Nevertheless, the implementing rule requires this result with
respect to all products costing more than $10 and less than $15.01.
25. The preemption problems of the Act are discussed in Schmitt & Kovac,
Magnuson-Moss vs. State Protective Consumer Legislation: Validity of a Stricter
State Standard of Warranty Protection, 30 ARK. L. Rev. 21 (1976). The authors
conclude that preemption problems exist with respect to the labeling and disclosure
provisions of the Act. They suggest that the FTC should act to review and validate,
under the provisions of the Act, state consumer protection legislation more protec-
tive than that of the Act and thus,subject to preemption. Id. at 33. See also Com-
ment, .Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12
STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959).
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of state law, but it is clear from the hearings26 and committee
reports27 that Congress was aware of that possibility.
With respect to the Uniform Commercial Code provisions allowing
disclaimer of implied warranties, section 108 of the Act and its legisla-
tive history demonstrate congressional intent to supersede inconsistent
state provisions.28 In addition, section lll(c) 29 precludes state la-
beling or disclosure requirements that, if within the scope of the Act,
are not identical to the requirements of the Act and do not have prior
approval of the Federal Trade Commission. Unfortunately, confusion
arises because section 111 (b)(1) specifically preserves consumer rights
26. See Consumer Products Warranties and Improvement Act of 1971: Hear-
ings on S. 986 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1971) (memorandum of Federal Trade Commission)
[hereinafter cited as 1971 Senate Hearings]; id. at 115 (statement of George Lamb):
id. at 136 (statement of J. Edward Day); id. at 174 (statement of Alan Weber); id.
at 195 (discussion between Eugene A. Keeny and Senator Cook); id. at 204-05 (dis-
cussion between Eugene A. Keeny and staff counsel); id. at 243 (question asked by
Senator Cook). See also Consumer Warranty Protection: Hearings on H. R. 6313,
H.R. 6314, H.R. 261, H.R. 4809, H.R. 5037, H.R. 10673 (and similar and identical
bills) Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 128-29 (1971) (statement of
Fairfax Leary, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as 1971 House Hearings]; id. at 208-09
(statement of Miles W. Kirkpatrick); Consumer Warranty Protection-1973: Hear-
ings on H. R. 20 and H. R. 5021 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong.. Ist Sess. 93-94
(1973)(statement of Fairfax Leary, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as 1973 House Hearings];
id. at 343 (statement submitted on behalf of Sears. Roebuck. & Co.). The statements
and testimony at these proceedings indicated that preemption of state law was in-
tended by the drafters.
27. See S. REP. No. 151. 93d Cong.. 1st Sess. 25 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 1107.
93d Cong.. 2d Sess. 43-44 (1974). reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7702. 7725.
28. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 108, 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (Supp. V 1975)
provides:
(a) No supplier may disclaim or modify (except as provided in subsection
(b)) any implied warranty to a consumer with respect to such consumer pro-
duct if (1) such supplier makes any written warranty to the consumer with re-
spect to such consumer product, or (2) at the time of sale, or within 90 days
thereafter, such supplier enters into a service contract with the consumer which
applies to such consumer product.
(b) For purposes of this title (other than section 104(a)(2). implied war-
ranties may be limited in duration to the duration of a written warranty of rea-
sonable duration, if such limitation is conscionable and is set forth in clear and
unmistakable language and prominently displayed on the face of the warranty.
(c) A disclaimer, modification, or limitation made in violation of this section
shall be ineffective for purposes of this title and State law.
See 120 CONG. REC. S21,977 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Magnuson);
S. REP. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1973); H. R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 40 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7702, 7721-22.
Both the Senate and House reports specifically refer to preemption by the Act where state
provisions differ from those of the Act.
29. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 111(c). 15 U.S.C. § 2311(c) (Supp. V 1975)
provides:
402
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and remedies under state law.30 Because the effect of this section is
not clear, the preemption problem underlies much of the Act, and will
thus be noted as it relates to specific provisions discussed in this note.
II. PRIVITY OF CONTRACT IN BREACH OF
WARRANTY ACTIONS
The concept of privity of contract often provides a defense to a
breach of warranty action, and is thus of importance when discussing
the consumer product warranty area. Washington statutory and case
law on privity is significantly affected by the privity provisions of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.
A. Horizontal Privity
The privity between the seller and various individuals after sale to
the original purchaser is known as horizontal privity. The lack of such
privity may preclude the liability of the seller for breach of warranty
to the remote user of a consumer product.31
(1) Except as provided in subsection (b) and in paragraph (2) of this sub-
section, a State requirement-
(A) which relates to labeling or disclosure with respect to written warranties or
performance thereunder;
(B) which is within the scope of an applicable requirement of sections 102, 103,
and 104 (and rules implementing such sections), and
(C) which is not identical to a requirement of section 102, 103, or 104 (or a
rule thereunder),
shall not be applicable to written warranties complying with such sections (or
rules thereunder).
(2) If, upon application of an appropriate State agency, the Commission de-
termines (pursuant to rules issued in accordance with section 100) that any re-
quirements of such State covering any transaction to which this title applies (A)
affords protection to consumers greater than the requirements of this title and (B)
does not unduly burden interstate commerce, then such State requirement shall be
applicable (notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection) to
the extent specified in such determination for so long as the State administers and
enforces effectively any such greater requirement.
30. Id. § 11l(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1) provides: "Nothing in this chapter
shall invalidate or restrict any right or remedy of any consumer under State law or
any other Federal law." This provision would seem to be in conflict with Section
11 1(c), quoted at note 29 supra, because a state disclosure or labeling provision
would give a consumer rights and remedies under state law. Although it is assumed
that the legislation intends to maximize consumer protection, § I I l(c) requires ap-
proval of the FTC to validate any state labeling or disclosure provision, even though
such provision is more protective than the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. See notes
91-97 and accompanying text infra.
31. Horizontal privity questions arise when a transferee of the original consumer
attempts to recover for breach of warranty against the retail seller. See [1976] 2 CoN-
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Washington has adopted the "narrow" version of three U.C.C.
privity alternatives in R.C.W. § 62A.2-318,32 but many states have
judicially or legislatively adopted more liberal alternatives. 33 Although
the Washington court has recognized the continuing trend away from
the privity requirement in warranty cases, 34 it has abandoned the re-
quirement only where strict liability for personal injury may be in-
voked. 35 Whether horizontal privity is necessary in purely economic
SUMER PROTECTION: REPORTING SERVICE (Anderson) § 18.02(F)(7); E. PETERS, COM-
MERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 438 (1971); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 11-2, at 327 (1972). See also Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d
279, 287 (Alas. 1976).
32. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-318 (1976) provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural per-
son who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home
if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use. consume or be affected by
the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may
not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
The alternative provisions not adopted in Washington read:
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or
limit the operation of this section.
Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the opera-
tion of this section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom
the warranty extends. (As amended 1966).
U.C.C. § 2-318.
The Washington provision (Alternative A) gives the narrowest coverage, extending
warranties only to family, household or guests of the buyer.
The official comment to the U.C.C. takes a neutral position as to extending breach
of warranty protection without privity beyond the "family" limits of the statute:
[Alternative A] expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the fam-
ily. household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this. the section in this form
is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on
whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other
persons in the distributive chain.
U.C.C. § 2-318, Comment 3.
33. See Comment, UCC Section 2-318: Effect on Washington Requirements of
Privily in Products Liability Suits, 42 WASH. L. REV. 253, 258-65 (1966). For a list-
ing of various state approaches to the privity question, see IA UNIFORM LAWS ANNO-
TATED 54--56 (master ed. 1976).
34. See Brewer v. Oriard Powder Co., 66 Wn. 2d 187, 192, 401 P.2d 844, 847
(1965) (privity of contract not necessary in an action against the manufacturer of
defective dynamite). The court called the privity problem the "Sargasso Sea of the
law," id. at 190, 401 P.2d at 846, and stated that "a searching judicial review of the
privity rule is in order." Id. at 193, 401 P.2d at 847. Such a review by the Washington
court has yet to appear.
35. Washington has adopted strict liability and abandoned the requirement of priv-
ity in personal injury actions. See Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wn. 2d 522, 452 P.2d
729 (1969); Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wn. 2d 833. 454 P.2d 205 (1969).
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loss-breach of warranty actions has not been determined in Washing-
ton.36 It is therefore unknown whether the Washington court would:
1) follow the "consumer protection" stance that some courts have
taken which does not allow lack of privity between the economically
harmed party and the manufacturer or seller to bar recovery in breach
of warranty,37 or 2) follow an approach more consistent with a literal
interpretation of R.C.W. § 62A.2-318 which would bar economic
loss recovery when privity is lacking. 38
One effect of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act will be to clarify
privity requirements in economic loss-breach of warranty situations
involving consumer products. The provisions of the Act and rules
thereunder directly address the horizontal privity question. The defini-
tion of "consumer," under both the Act39 and the implementing rule,40
includes the buyer of any consumer product and any person to whom
36. See generally 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 370 (1972) (Texas law).
37. See, e.g., Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 NJ. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965)
(privity not required as matter of public policy in an action against manufacturer for
defective carpeting); Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919
(D.C. Ct. App. 1962) (privity not required because of policy of protecting consumers
from physical or pecuniary injury in an action for breach of implied warranty on new
automobile); Fashion Novelty Corp. of N. J. v. Cocker Machine & Foundry Co., 331
F. Supp. 960 (D.NJ. 1971) (no privity of contract required for recovery of economic
loss in an action involving defective machinery); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc.,
548 P.2d 279 (Alas. 1976) (privity not required as a matter of public policy protect-
ing consumers in an action for breach of implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for particular purpose). The Morrow decision contains an excellent discussion
of the economic loss-privity issue.
38. See, e.g., Koellner v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 478, 276 A.2d
807 (1970) (privity required for breach of warranty recovery against truck manufac-
turer); Necktas v. General Motors Corp., 357 Mass. 546, 259 N.E.2d 234 (1970)
(property damage recovery denied where no privity of contract between purchaser and
manufacturer of defective automobile); Hupp Corp. v. Metered Washer Serv., 256
Ore. 245, 472 P.2d 81.6 (1970) (buyer of clothes dryer parts could not recover eco-
nomic loss for breach of warranty from manufacturer because no privity of contract);
Price v. Gatlin, 241 Ore. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965) (purchaser of allegedly defective
tractor not allowed breach of warranty recovery against wholesaler because of lack of
privity); Thermal Supply of Tex., Inc. v. Asel, 468 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971)
(privity of contract required for breach of warranty action to recover economic loss of
allegedly defective air conditioning compressor). See also Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 683
(1967).
39. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 101(3), 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3) (Supp. V 1975)
provides:
The term "consumer" means a buyer (other than for purposes of resale) of any
consumer product, any person to whom such product is transferred during the
duration of an implied or written warranty (or service contract) applicable to the
product, and any other person who is entitled by the terms of such warranty (or
service contract) or under applicable State law to enforce against the warrantor
(or service contractor) the obligations of the warranty (or service contract).
40. The definition of "consumer" in the implementing rule is essentially the same
as that of the Act. 16 C.F.R. § 701.1(h) (1976).
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such product is "transferred" 4 1 during the duration of a written or
implied warranty.
In the "full" warranty situation, 42 the Act requires that "full" war-
ranty obligations extend to each person who is a "consumer" with re-
spect to the consumer product.43 Thus, the original purchaser or any
person to whom the product is "transferred" is entitled to warranty
protection where the product carries a "full" warranty. 44 "Full" war-
ranty status thus obviates the problem of horizontal privity in con-
sumer product actions under the Act.
As to whether coverage exists in "limited" warranty situations re-
gardless of the existence of privity, the Act is ambiguous. The final
version of the Act seems to verify concerns expressed in early hearings
that the language in the definition of "consumer" permits a "limited"
warrantor to utilize the doctrine of privity.45 But the fact that the Act
affirmatively includes warranty protection despite lack of privity if a
product is "fully" warranted 46 implies that a "limited" warranty is not
required to include warranty coverage where privity is lacking. Deter-
mining who can enforce a "limited" warranty is made even more diffi-
cult by language in the Act and implementing rule covering specific
warranty disclosures. The Act states that the rule may require inclu-
41. See note 44 infra.
42. See notes 12-18 and accompanying text supra.
43. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 104(b)(4). 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(4) (Supp.
V 1975).
44. Neither the Act nor the implementing rules discuss the term "transferred." It is
assumed that the term refers to transfer of physical possession and is not limited to
transfer of legal title. See note 49 infra. See also 41 Fed. Reg. 34,655-56 (1976)
(proposing 16 C.F.R. § 700.6). The proposed rule states that a "full" warranty may
not expressly restrict the warranty rights of a transferee during its stated duration, but
that a warrantor would not be precluded from making the duration of the "full" war-
ranty equal to the period of the first purchaser's ownership. For example, the warranty
for an automobile muffler might be phrased "full warranty for as long as you own
your car." Id. at 34.656. This is apparently the only situation where a transferee of a
"fully" warranted consumer product would not receive warranty coverage.
45. The definition of "consumer" reads in part: "any other person who is entitled
by the terms of such warranty . . . to enforce against the warrantor . . . the obliga-
tions of the warranty." Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 101(3). 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3)
(Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added). The implication of this language is that the war-
rantor can require privity in some circumstances. Allowing the lack of privity of con-
tract to defeat an action for breach of warranty was seen in early hearings as incon-
gruous with the Act's purposes. See 1973 House Hearings, supra note 26, at 103
(statement of Fairfax Leary. Jr.).
The definition of "consumer" in the Act also fails to comport with the statement of
a Senate report: "The intent of the definition [of consumer] is to make clear that the
supplier is not entitled to specify which classes of people may enforce the obligations
of the warranty . . . . These obligations extend to at least the first purchaser and any
subsequent transferee .... S. REP. No. 151, 93d Cong.. 1st Sess. 12 (1973).
46. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
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sion in the warranty of "[t] he identity of the party or parties to whom
the warranty is extended. '47 The implementing rule requires disclo-
sure when limiting enforceability to the original consumer purchaser
and to persons "other than every consumer owner during the term of
the warranty. '48 The Act, the implementing rules, and the explana-
tions accompanying the rules unfortunately do not explain the term
"consumer owner." 49 Although the language of the Act and under-
lying rules is most confusing as to who is entitled to protection in the
"limited" warranty situation, it is apparent from the language of the
implementing rule that the Commission intends that the doctrine of
privity can be relevant to at least some parties vis-a-vis the war-
rantor.50
The effect of the Act on Washington's horizontal privity provision
is thus twofold. For a consumer product carrying a "full" warranty
under the Act, the provisions of R.C.W. § 62A.2-318 are expanded
to provide warranty coverage beyond the "family and guest" to every
consumer of the product despite lack of privity. The Act brings signif-
47. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 102(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2) (Supp.
V 1975). Note that although this disclosure section applies to both "full" and "lim-
ited" warranties, the "full" warranty provisions render this provision inapplicable in
the "full" warranty context. See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
48. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(1) (1976) reads: "[The warranty shall disclose] [t]he
identity of the party or parties to whom the written warranty is extended, if the en-
forceability of the written warranty is limited to the original consumer purchaser or is
otherwise limited to persons other than every consumer owner during the term of the
warranty." Id. (emphasis added). The proposed rule provided for disclosure of" [t] he
identity of the party or parties to whom the warranty is extended, including where
applicable, any limitation on its enforceability by any party other than the first pur-
chaser at retail." 40 Fed. Reg. 29,893 (1975) (proposing 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(b)). Had
the proposed language become final, it would be clear that a warrantor could limit
enforceability and in effect require privity of contract between consumer and warran-
tor in the limited warranty context.
49. This could mean that the FTC is interpreting the term "transferred" to refer
to change of ownership and not mere possession, but such an interpretation seems in-
herently inconsistent with the definition of "consumer," see note 39 supra, and will
have to be explained by the Commission or judicially interpreted. See also Magnuson-
Moss Statements, supra note 2, at 60,172 where the FTC states that the final rule adopts
an industry recommendation that disclosure be required only when the warranty does
not extend to the original purchaser and all transferees during the warranty period.
Since the final rule uses the term "every consumer owner" instead of "transferees," it
would seem that the Commission is equating the two terms. See 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)
(1976).
50. The Washington statute gives non-privity of contract warranty protection to
the "family." See note 32 supra. The question might be raised whether the Act would
permit a warrantor to reinstate the doctrine of privity against those persons apparently
protected by the Washington provision. The answer should be that the Act's preserva-
tion of consumers' rights and remedies protects the "family" provision in the Washing-
ton statute. Cf. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § ll(b)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1)
(Supp. V 1975), quoted at note 30 supra.
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icant change to the Washington provision, and warrantors should be
aware that when they give "full" written warranties and thus comply
with the federal minimum standards for warranty,5' they cannot hide
behind the defense of a lack of privity. The "limited" warranty product
appears to fall under the traditional state provisions. The "limited"
warrantor can restrict the enforceability of the warranty to the original
consumer purchaser, subject of course to the state U.C.C. provisions.5 2
B. Vertical Privity
Another aspect of Washington law affected by the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act involves "vertical privity"-so named because it con-
cerns the liability of remote sellers, manufacturers, distributors, and
others up and down the chain of distribution. 53 Washington's privity
statute mentions only "seller," and the official comments to the section
speak only to the question of horizontal privity.54 While the Wash-
ington court has endorsed liability for parties other than retail sellers
in personal injury actions,5 5 it has not determined the liability of re-
mote sellers or manufacturers in economic loss situations since the
enactment of R.C.W. § 62A.2-318.56 Courts in other jurisdictions
have distinguished between express and implied warranties, allowing
recovery of economic losses without vertical privity in the former 57
while disallowing it in the latter.58
51. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 2304 (Supp. V 1975).
52. See notes 32-36 and accompanying text supra.
53. Where a consumer purchaser sues the remote manufacturer or supplier with
whom he or she has had no contact, the issue of vertical privity arises. See sources cited
note 31 supra.
54. See note 32 supra.
55. See, e.g., Nelson v. West Coast Dairy Co., 5 Wn. 2d 284, 105 P.2d 76 (1940)
(implied warranty of fitness for food).
56. Prior to the enactment of WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-3 18, the Washington
court had recognized that lack of vertical privity would bar a breach of warranty action
in economic loss situations. In Dimff v. Ernie Majer, Inc., 55 Wn. 2d 385, 347 P.2d
1056 (1960), the court held that where there was no privity, no warranty existed ab-
sent negligence, fraud, or a dangerous instrumentality. Accord, Wise v. Hayes, 58 Wn.
2d 106, 361 P.2d 171 (1961); Kasey v. Suburban Gas Heat. 60 Wn. 2d 468, 374 P.2d
549 (1962). But see Nakanishi v. Foster, 64 Wn. 2d 647, 393 P.2d 635 (1964) (priv-
ity requirement apparently replaced with a standard of reasonable care).
57. See, e.g., Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181
N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) (resin maker's express warranty of nonshrink-
age to material manufacturer enforceable by garment manufacturer having no privity
with the resin maker); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Mathews, 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d
643 (1973) (express warranty through advertising enforceable by one not in privity
with manufacturer of scaffolding equipment).
58. See, e.g., State ex rel. W. Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell. 250 Ore. 262, 442
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Section 110(t) of the Magnuson-Moss Act establishes a cause of
action only against the warrantor actually making a written warran-
ty.59 The definition of "warrantor" in the final implementing rules is
"any supplier or other person who gives or offers to give a written
warranty." 60 "Supplier" is defined as "any person engaged in the busi-
ness of making a consumer product directly or indirectly available to
consumers. ' 61 Thus, the Act seems to meet potential vertical privity
problems directly, giving the consumer a cause of action against
anyone in the distribution chain who gives or offers to give a written
warranty. As to whom the warranty must be given, however, the Act is
unclear. If a component manufacturer warrants the component to a
product assembler, does the ultimate consumer of the product receive
the right to enforce that component warranty? The proposed imple-
menting rule answers in the negative unless the warranty is a basis of
the bargain between seller and consumer.6 2 Thus with the exception
P.2d 215 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969) (privity of contract required in
action for economic loss against producer of defective seed).
59. The section provides: "For purposes of this section, only the warrantor actually
making a written affirmation of fact, promise, or undertaking shall be deemed to have
created a written warranty, and any rights arising thereunder may be enforced under
this section only against such warrantor and no other person." Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty Act § 110(f), 15 U.S.C. § 23 10(f) (Supp. V 1975).
60. 16 C.F.R. § 701.1(g) (1976). Both the Act and the proposed warranty rule
provided that "warrantor" included one who was liable under an implied warranty
arising under state law. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 101(5), 15 U.S.C. §
2301(5) (Supp. V 1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 29,894 (1975) (proposing 16 C.F.R. § 702.1(d)). The FTC deleted the implied warranty language in the final disclosure rules,
finding it too broad for a provision dealing only with written warranty disclosures. See
Magn ason-Moss Statements, supra note 2, at 60,170.
Thus, for purposes of a-suit for failing to disclose warranty information in accordance
with the Act, a person liable under implied but not written warranties would not be
liable for failure to disclose under the Act. This should not be confused with the ability
to sue an implied warrantor for breach of warranty under the Act. See Part VI infra.
61. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 101(4), 15 U.S.C. § 2301(4) (Supp. V 1975);
16 C.F.R. §§ 701.1(f), 702.1(f) (1976). The proposed rule also explained that "sup-
plier" meant sellers, manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, jobbers, and any other
parts of the distribution system. See 40 Fed. Reg. 29,894 (1975) (proposing 16 C.F.R.§ 702. l(g)). This language, however, was deleted from the final implementing rule.
62. 41'Fed. Reg. 34,655 (1976) (proposing 16 C.F.R. § 700.3(d)) provides:
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act generally applies to written warranties cov-
ering consumer products. Many consumer products are covered by warranties
which are neither intended for, nor enforceable by, consumers. A common exam-
ple is a warranty given by a component supplier to a manufacturer of consumer
products. (The manufacturer may, in turn, warrant these components to consu-
mers.) The component supplier's warranty is generally given solely to the product
manufacturer, and is neither intended to be conveyed to the consumer nor brought
to the consumer's attention in connection with a sale. Such warranties are not sub-ject to the Act, since a written warranty under Section 101(6) of the Act must
become "part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for pur-
poses other than resale." However the Act applies to a component supplier's war-
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of warranties given to assemblers and the like which are not intended
to be communicated to consumers, manufacturers will be liable to
consumers on written warranties despite a lack of privity between the
parties.
A related issue which is not addressed by the Washington U.C.C.
provisions involves the possibility of the dealer's liability on a manu-
facturer's express warranty where the dealer itself has made no war-
ranty. In Cochran v. McDonald63 the Washington court held that
such liability turns on whether the seller has "adopted" the manufac-
turer's warranty. 64 The Cochran decision apparently still represents
the Washington position, with the result that a retail dealer must take
some sort of affirmative action in order to be liable upon the manufac-
turer's warranty.
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act appears to uphold the require-
ment of adoption, as well as to specify how it will take place. Under
section I 10(f)65 a dealer would seemingly be unable to adopt a manu-
facturer's warranty by any act less than a written affirmation; how-
ever, the conference report 66 and proposed rules 67 contradict the
ranty in writing which is given to the consumer. An example is a supplier's writ-
ten warranty to the consumer covering a refrigerator that is sold installed in a boat
or recreational vehicle. The supplier of the refrigerator relies on the boat or
vehicle assembler to convey the written agreement to the consumer. In this case.
the supplier's written warranty is to a consumer, and is covered by the Act.
The rule also points out that the definition of written warranty under section 101(6)
of the Act, quoted at note 7 supra, requires that such a warranty must be part of the
basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale.
63. 23 Wn. 2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945).
64. The Cochran case involved an action against a seller by a purchaser of defec-
tive antifreeze, based upon the manufacturer's express warranty. The court did not
explicitly define what type of conduct by a seller on resale constitutes an adoption, but
did hold that the mere fact of resale does not itself constitute an adoption. Id. at 351.
161 P.2d at 306. The court relied upon a leading Minnesota case, Pemberton v. Dean.
88 Minn. 60. 92 N.W. 478 (1902). and held that the antifreeze seller had merely sold
the product and had not adopted the warranty. See also Scovil v. Chilcoat. 424 P.2d
87. 91 (Okla. 1967) (adoption of the manufacturer's warranty could be found where
dealer made statement that an engine "would be guaranteed."); R. DUESENBERG & L. KING.
SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6.08 [21
([ 1966] 3 BENDER'S U.C.C. SERVICE).
65. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § l10(f), 15 U.S.C. § 2310(f) (Supp. V 1975).
quoted at note 59 supra.
66. "The conferees intend that, if under State law a warrantor or other person is
deemed to have made a written affirmation of fact. promise, or undertaking he would
be treated for purposes of section 110 as having made such affirmation of fact, prom-
ise, or undertaking." S. REP. No. 1408. 93d Cong.. 2d Sess. 27 (1974). reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7755. 7759.
67. A supplier who does no more than distribute or sell a consumer product cov-
ered by a written warranty offered by another person or business and which
identifies that person or business as the warrantor is not liable for failure of the
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"written only" language of the Act. Those sources indicate that dealer
actions other than a writing can support liability under the original
manufacturer's written warranty.68 Consequently, although the Act
appears to protect a retail dealer who does not give any sort of a writ-
ing, such may not be the case, and retailers must be concerned with
not inadvertently adopting their suppliers' consumer product warran-
ties. 69
Consumers and sellers should also note that the definition of "war-
rantor" 70 includes third parties who give warranties despite a lack of
direct involvement in the manufacture or distribution of the consumer
product. The definition thus brings a magazine's "seal of approval"
within the ambit of the Act.71 For liability under such a "written war-
ranty," however, such a third party warranty would have to be "part
of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer .... ,,72
written warranty to comply with the Act or rules thereunder. However, other
actions and written and oral representations of such a supplier in connection with
the offer or sale of a warranted product may obligate that supplier under the Act.
Suppliers are advised to consult state law to determine those actions and represen-
tations which may make them co-warrantors, and therefore obligated under the
warranty.
41 Fed. Reg. 34,655 (1976) (proposing 16 C.F.R. § 700.4) (emphasis added).
68. Thus, if a retail dealer in Washington has taken some action which constitutes
an adoption under the rule of Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wn. 2d 348, 161 P.2d 305
(1945), discussed at note 64 supra, such dealer could be liable under the Act having
never executed a writing.
69. This interpretation of section 110(f) is consistent with the perceived purposes
of the section by those testifying on the bill. See 1971 House Hearings, supra note 26,
at 323 (testimony of George Lamb); 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 26, at 125-27
(discussion between George Lamb and staff counsel); 1973 House Hearings, supra
note 26, at 171-77 (testimony of Thomas Nichol, Jr.). These witnesses indicated that
the purpose of the section was to protect manufacturers from inconsistent statements
by dealers. That dealers are not necessarily protected from liability under manufac-
turer's warranties seems consistent. See also S. REP. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 24
(1973), where the committee explains that such a provision [§ 110(f)] applies where
the salesperson of a product warranted by the manufacturer for one year, gives a
warranty on the product for five years. The drafters intended that only the salesperson
could be sued on the five year warranty absent a demonstrated agency relationship.
70. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 101(5), 15 U.S.C. § 2301(5) (Supp. V 1975),
quoted at note 6 supra. See also 16 C.F.R. §§ 701.1(g), 702.1(d) (1976); S. REP. No.
1408, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7755, 7760.
71. Indeed the FTC added 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(b) (1976) in response to such "seal
of approval" magazines. The provision exempts such magazines from fulfilling all the
disclosure requirements on the product seal, allowing disclosure in the magazine in-
stead. See Magnuson-Moss Statements, supra note 2, at 60,179 (1975). See also GOOD
HOUSEKEEPING, Jafnuary 1977, at 6.
72. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 101(6)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(B)
(Supp. V 1975), quoted at note 7 supra; 16 C.F.R. §§ 701.1(c)(2), 702.1(c)(2)
(1976).
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III. DISCLAIMER AND MODIFICATION OF IMPLIED
WARRANTIES
A. Disclaimer
Prior to 1974, Washington was one of the majority of jurisdictions
retaining the provisions of the official version of the U.C.C. con-
cerning disclaimer of implied warranties. 73 The statute provided that
implied warranties could be disclaimed by mentioning merchantability
and making the disclaimer conspicuous.7 4
In 1971 the Washington Supreme Court in Berg v. Stromme75 sig-
nificantly altered the state's warranty law. The court noted that
printed disclaimers were increasingly regarded with disfavor,76 and
held that waivers of the implied warranties of merchantability and
73. See generally IA UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 8-10 (master ed. 1976).
74. Prior to 1974 the Washington statute read:
SEC. 2-316. Exclusion or Modification of Warrantlies. (I) Words or conduct
relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or conduct tending to
negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with
each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evi-
dence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such
construction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and
in case of a writing must be conspicuous and to exclude or modify any implied
warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language
to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that
"There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are ex-
cluded by expressions like "as is". "with all faults" or other language which
in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of
warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or
the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the
goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an exam-
ination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of dealing
or course of performance or usage of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the pro-
visions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages and on contractual
modification of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719).
Uniform Commercial Code, Ch. 157, § 2-316 1965 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 2333
(current version at WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-316 (1976)).
75. 79 Wn. 2d 184, 484 P.2d 380 (1971). In Berg, the plaintiff sued for breach of
implied warranty when his new car turned out to be a "lemon." The court ruled for
the plaintiff in spite of the fact that the printed sales contract form contained a dis-
claimer of implied warranties.
76. Id. at 187, 484 P.2d at 382.
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fitness for a particular purpose were ineffectual unless explicitly nego-
tiated between buyer and seller.77
In 1974 the Washington Legislature responded to the Berg v.
Stromme holding by amending the disclaimer of implied warranties
provision to provide that in the case of goods purchased for personal,
family, or household use, disclaimers of the implied warranties are
effective only as to those qualities and characteristics particularly set
forth as not being warranted.78 Thus, a seller must specifically list the
parts of a consumer product which are not being protected by the
implied warranties. While placing an increased burden on sellers who
wish to disclaim implied warranties, the Washington provision still
allows such action if the seller takes the proper steps.
Both the Berg decision and the subsequent statutory change indi-
cated a recognition on the part of the Washington court and legisla-
ture of the need for protecting consumers from disclaimers of implied
warranties. The specific practice of offering an express warranty while
disclaiming the implied warranties was of concern throughout the his-
tory of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.79 This concern led to the
conclusion that implied warranties should not be disclaimed and re-
sulted in what is the Act's most significant impact on Washington war-
ranty law: section 108 of the Act provides that no supplier may dis-
77. "Waivers of such warranties, being disfavored in law, are ineffectual unless
explicitly negotiated between buyer and seller and set forth with particularity showing
the particular qualities and characteristics of fitness which are being waived." Id. at 196,
484 P.2d at 386. See also Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194, 491
P.2d 1346 (1971).
78. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-316(4) (1976) reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and
the provisions of RCW 62A.2-719, as now or hereafter amended, in any case
where goods are purchased primarily for personal, family or household use and
not for commercial or business use, disclaimers of the warranty of merchantabil-
ity or fitness for particular purpose shall not be effective to limit the liability of
merchant sellers except insofar as the disclaimer sets forth with particularity the
qualities and characteristics which are not being warranted. Remedies for breach
of warranty can be limited in accordance with the provisions of this Article on
liquidation or limitation of damages and on contractual modification of remedy
(RCW 62A.2-718 and RCW 62A.2-719).
The earlier version lacked the provision requiring specification of qualities or charac-
teristics not warranted. See note 74 supra.
79. See 120 CONG. REC. S21,977 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Mag-
nuson); 1971 House Hearings, supra note 26, at 309-12; 1971 Senate Hearings, supra
note 26, at 45; H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1974); S. REP. No.
151, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 7, 21 (1973). These materials note the widespread practice
of giving an express warranty which appeared to have substantial value yet did not,
and simultaneously disclaiming the implied warranties.
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claim any implied warranty if a written warranty is given,8 0 and that
any attempt to disclaim implied warranties in a written warranty is
ineffective for purposes of the Act and state law.81 The statute thus
goes much beyond the protective provisions of R.C.W. § 62A.2-316,
and it specifically precludes their applicability whenever "consumer
products" 8 2 are covered by written warranties.
B. Modification
What the left hand of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act giveth to
consumers regarding the prohibition of disclaimers, the right hand
may well taketh away by section 108(b)8 3 which allows "limited"
warrantors to restrict the duration of implied warranties. Under the
U.C.C. implied warranty provisions, the concept of reasonableness
has governed the length of time an implied warranty exists.8 4 Under
the final version of the Act,8 5 however, the implied warranties may be
limited to the duration of "a written warranty of reasonable duration"86
if certain criteria are met.8 7 While the concept of reasonableness
will thus continue to play a part in determining the duration of im-
plied warranties, the Act has given warrantors increased influence in
the determination process.88 Any modification of an implied warranty
80. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 108(a). 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a), (Supp. V
1975), quoted at note 28 supra. Note also that a "supplier" becomes a "'warrantor"
upon making a written warranty. Id. § 101(4)-(5). 15 U.S.C. § 2301(4)-(5) (Supp.
V 1975); 16 C.F.R. §§ 701.1(f). (g). 702.1(d). (f) (1976).
81. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 108(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2308(c) (Supp. V
1975). quoted at note 28, supra.
82. See note 10 supra (definition of "consumer product").
83. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 108(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (Supp. V
1975). quoted at note 28 supra. This provision allows a "limited- warrantor to set
the duration of implied warranties. "Full" warrantors are prohibited from doing so.
Id. § 104(a)(2). 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
84. See l1 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 340. 343 (1970); 46 CORNELL L.Q. 607.
612 (1961). See also Wood v. Hub Motor Co.. 110 Ga. App. 101. 137 S.E. 2d 674
(1964) (implied warranties are effective for a reasonable time).
85. The Senate version expressly provided that the duration of an implied war-
ranty could not be limited. S. REP. No. 151. 93d Cong.. 1st Sess. 37 (1973).
86. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 108(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (Supp. V 1975).
quoted at note 28 supra. Apparently it will be up to judicial decision to identify such
"reasonable" written warranties.
87. Id. The criteria are: the limitation must be conscionable, set forth in clear and
unmistakable language, and prominently displayed on the face of the warranty. For a
discussion of the unconscionability aspects of time limits on warranties, see I I B.C.
INous. & COM. L. REv. 340, 350 (1970).
88. It is generally assumed that implied warranties last longer and provide more
protection than written warranties. This is why manufacturers traditionally disclaimed
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other than a limitation of duration, however, is ineffective for pur-
poses of the Act and state law.89
The Act's explicit delineation of the procedure required to modify
the duration of implied warranties90 raises the issue of the viability of
inconsistent state law provisions. Section 111(c) of the Act91 provides
that state requirements relating to warranty labeling or disclosure
which are not identical to the Act's requirements are not applicable to
written warranties complying with the Act, unless prior approval has
been given by the Federal Trade Commission. The Washington
statute requires that any modification of the implied warranty of mer-
chantability must specifically mention "merchantability. '9 2 As the
Washington provision applies to both oral and written warranties, in
the context of a written warranty it could be termed a "State require-
ment . . . which relates to labeling or disclosure with respect to
written warranties . . . ,,93 Because the Washington statute is thus
implied warranties with written warranties, see note 79 and accompanying text supra,
and why the language of the Act itself provides that implied warranties "may be Ilin-
ited in duration." See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 108(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b)
(Supp. V 1975), quoted at note 28 supra (emphasis added).
Because the Act does not define "reasonable written warranty," it will be for the
judiciary to determine its meaning. Unlike the U.C.C., however, the Act allows a pre-
determined limitation on implied warranty duration: the length of a "reasonable"
written warranty. It is not likely that courts will require "reasonable" written warran-
ties to be of the same duration as implied warranties under the U.C.C. if for no other
reason than that to do so would negate the effects of the Act. That is, if a "reasonable"
written warranty had to be of the same duration as an implied warranty, one can
hardly be said to be limiting the duration of implied warranties.
Consequently, because it will be warrantors who determine the duration of their
written warranties, the Act gives them a good deal more influence over the duration
of implied warranties than do the traditional U.C.C. provisions. This will aid "limited"
warrantors by providing a more definite period of exposure to breach of warranty
suits, but it is submitted that consumers buying "limited warranty" products will re-
ceive implied warranty coverage of shorter duration than under the U.C.C. or a "full"
written warranty, where implied warranty duration remains governed by reasonable-
ness.
89. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 108(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2308(c) (Supp. V 1975)
provides: "A disclaimer, modification, or limitation made in violation of this section
shall be ineffective for purposes of this title and State law."
This language may render the "course of dealing" and "trade usage" provisions of
WASH. Rav. CODE § 62A.2-316(3)(c), see note 74 supra, invalid in the written war-
ranty context. Because these U.C.C. provisions are methods of disclaiming, modifying,
or limiting implied warranties, and because they are not in accordance with section
108, the Act makes them ineffective where a written warranty is given.
90. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
91. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 111(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2311(c) (Supp. V 1975),
quoted at note 29 supra.
92. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-316(2) (1976).
93. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 111(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2311(c)(1) (Supp.
V 1975), quoted qt note 29 supra.
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"not identical to" the provisions of the Act (which require no mention
of merchantability), the language of section 111 (c) should supersede
the R.C.W. § 62A.2-316 requirements.9 4 This would mean that a
written "limited" warranty would not have to include the word "mer-
chantability" when it was modifying that implied warranty.
In contrast to the above analysis is the strong statement of section
111(b)(1) 95 that nothing in the title shall invalidate any right or
remedy of any consumer under state law. In view of R.C.W. §
62A.2-316(2), it should be argued that Washington consumers have
the right to see the term "merchantability" when that implied war-
ranty is being modified, and that such right is thus preserved by sec-
tion 11 (b)(1).
This inconsistency in the language of the Act will have to be re-
solved judicially, or administratively by application to the Federal
Trade Commission 96 for permission to enforce the more restrictive
provision.97
IV. LIMITATION OF REMEDIES
A. Washington Law
The Washington U.C.C. provisions specifically provide for limita-
tions on remedies if the requirements of R.C.W. § 62A.2-719 98 are
met. That provision gives two examples of limitations of remedy:
"limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment of
94. Indeed, the section was included in the Act to supersede differing state provi-
sions in order to prevent national manufacturers from having to supply different war-
ranties for every state. See 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 26. at 128 (statement of
George Lamb), 136 (testimony of J. Edward Day), 174 (testimony of Alan Weber):
1973 House Hearings, supra note 26, at 169 (testimony of Thomas Nichol. Jr.):
S. REP. No. 151. 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1973).
95. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 11l(b)(l). 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1) (Supp.
V 1975), quoted at note 30 supra.
96. See id. § 11 1(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2311(c)(2), quoted at note 29 supra.
97. For example, in July 1976, the Federal Trade Commission began a proceeding
to determine the viability of certain provisions of California's Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act (CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1790-1795.5 (West 1974)). See 41 Fed. Reg.
28,361 (1976).
98.
(I) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of
the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for
those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of damages re-
coverable under this Article. as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the
416
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the price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or
parts."99 In Washington, the seller is also permitted to provide that a
particular remedy is the sole and exclusive remedy if the buyer so
agrees. 10 0 In addition, R.C.W. § 62A.2-719(3) provides that any
limitation to repair or replacement of consumer goods is invalid if the
seller or manufacturer does not provide for a servicing facility within
the state.101
B. The Magnuson-Moss Act
The Act has several remedy provisions which will add to or modify
the possibilities under Washington law. These occur primarily under
the "full" warranty provisions, although certain additions apply to
both "full" and "limited" warranties.
Under the "full" warranty requirements, the warrantor "must as a
minimum remedy such consumer product within a reasonable time
and without charge .... ,102 A warrantor cannot limit the consum-
er's relief to only repair of the product because unreasonable compli-
cations will require replacement or refund. 103 Furthermore, the war-
rantor cannot require the consumer to accept only a refund unless
goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-conform-
ing goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly
agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its
essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Title.
(3) Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of
goods purchased primarily for personal, family or household use or of any services
related thereto is invalid unless it is proved that the limitation is not unconscion-
able. Limitation of remedy to repair or replacement of defective parts or non-
conforming goods is invalid in sales of goods primarily for personal, family or
household use unless the manufacturer or seller maintains-or provides within this
state facilities adequate to provide reasonable and expeditious performance of re-
pair or replacement obligations.
Limitation of other consequential damages is valid unless it is established that
the limitation is unconscionable.
WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-719 (1976).
99. Id. § 62A.2-719(1)(a).
100. Id. § 62A.2-719(l)(b).
101. Id. § 62A.2-719(3).
102. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 104(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1) (Supp.
V 1975). See note 14 supra (definition of "remedy").
103. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 101(10), 15 U.S.C. § 2301(10) (Supp. V
1975), quoted at note 14 supra. The "full" warranty provisions further provide that if
after a reasonable number of attempts by the warrantor to remedy the product it is
still defective, the warrantor must permit the consumer to elect either refund or re-
placement. Id. § 104(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4).
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repair is commercially impracticable and the warrantor is unable to
provide a replacement.10 4 Similarly, an attempt to limit the remedy
only to replacement of the product would be qualified by the defini-
tion of "remedy" 10 5 and the "full" warranty requirements 06 should
replacement become impossible.
The above Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act provisions contrast with
the remedy-limiting possibilities under Washington law. While the Act
incorporates the examples included in R.C.W. § 62A.2-719,107 it
apparently disallows a limitation to just one of them. This will make
R.C.W. § 62A.2-719(1)(b), 10 8 which allows for an exclusive remedy,
ineffective for purposes of a "full" written warranty. 0 9
The Act creates some remedies which are applicable to either "full"
or "limited" warranties irrespective of state law. 110 If a consumer pre-
vails in a breach of warranty action, the judgment may include costs,
104. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 101(10), 15 U.S.C. § 2301(10) (Supp. V
1975), quoted at note 14 supra. Prior to the sale of a consumer product, it might be
determined by the manufacturer that the repair of such product would be commercially
impracticable. A sponge warranted for a year would be an example of commercial
impracticability of repair.
A "one-of-a-kind" item or a manufacturer's last stock of a product might create the
situation where the manufacturer knows in advance that replacement would not be
possible. "Replacement" is defined, however, as "furnishing a new consumer product
which is identical or reasonably equivalent to the warranted consumer product." Id. §
101(1) I 15 U.S.C. § 2301(11) (emphasis added). Thus only rarely would it be pos-
sible to limit the remedy in advance of sale to only a refund.
105. Id. § 101(10), 15 U.S.C. 2301(10) (Supp. V 1975), quoted at note 14 supra.
106. Although the Act does not clearly prevent the exclusive limitation of "replace-
ment," section 104(a)(4) provides that a "full" warrantor is only given a reasonable
number of attempts to "remedy" defects. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 104(a)(4).
15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4) (Supp. V 1975). Because the term "remedy" includes repair.
refund, and replacement, the result is that replacement could not be made the exclu-
sive remedy unless it was known in advance that it could be accomplished in a
"reasonable" period of time and manner.
107. See note 98 supra. The examples are return of goods for refund and replace-
ment of non-conforming goods.
108. See note 98 supra.
109. The "limited" warranty provisions of the Act place no requirement on a war-
rantor to "remedy" a consumer product. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act §§ 102.
103(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302, 2303(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975). quoted at notes 8 & 11
supra. Instead, pursuant to the disclosure provisions of section 102. id. § 102, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2302. quoted at note 8. supra, and the implementing rule thereunder, 16 C.F.R. §
701.3 (1976), quoted at note 9 supra, the only requirement of a "limited" warrantor
regarding limitation of remedy is to fairly disclose how he or she is limiting the con-
sumer's remedy for breach of warranty.
110. Both the "limited" and "full" warrantor are, however, still subject to Wash-
ington's "service facility" provision. See WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-719(3) (1976).
quoted at note 98 supra. This is because the Act preserves a consumer's right or rem-
edy under state law. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 11 l(b)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 231 l(b)
(1) (Supp. V 1975), quoted at note 30 supra. The implementing rule also demonstrates
the Act's lack of interference with state limitation of remedy provisions: "[Any war-
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expenses, and reasonable attorney's fees.'11 No warrantor can pre-
clude the remedy provided by this explicit language of the Act. A fur-
ther limitation on a warrantor's ability to exclude remedies occurs if
the warrantor chooses to establish an informal dispute settlement
mechanism under section 110 and incorporate it into the warranty.
Presumably the warrantor and the consumer are then required to re-
sort to it.112
V. LIMITATION ON CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
A. Washington Law
The Washington provision on limitation of consequential damages
is R.C.W. § 62A.2-719(3),113 which provides that any limitation of
consequential damages for personal injury in the consumer product
setting is invalid unless proved conscionable. Other limitations of con-
sequential damages are valid unless proved unconscionable.M4 The
Washington statute makes no specific requirement to disclose or label
a limitation on consequential damages, such areas presumably being
governed by the concept of unconscionability. In a recent decision, 5
the Washington Supreme Court discussed the concept of unconsciona-
bility in commercial transactions, and held that the "conspicuousness"
rantor shall disclose] (8) [a] ny exclusions of or limitations on relief such as inciden-
tal or consequential damages, accompanied by the following statement ...: Some
states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of incidentalor consequential damages,
so the above limitation or exclusion may not apply to you." 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(8)
(1976).
11I. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 110(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (Supp.
V 1975) provides:
If a consumer finally prevails in any action brought under paragraph (1) of this
subsection, he may be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a
sum equal to the aggregate amount of cost and expenses(including attorneys' fees
based on actual time expended) determined by the court to have been reasonably
incurred by the plaintiff for or in connection with the commencement and prose-
cution of such action, unless the court in its discretion shall determine that such
an award of attorneys' fees would be inappropriate.
112. Id. § 110(a)(3)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3)(i) (Supp. V 1975). Some ques-
tion might be raised as to the ability of the warrantor to avoid use of this procedure
even when established, however, because the implementing rule at 16 C.F.R. § 703.50)
(1976) provides that decisions of the settlement mechanism are not legally binding on
any person. See also Magnuson-Moss Statements, supra note 2, at 60,190-(further de-
tails on the procedure). .
113. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-719(3) (1976), quoted at note 98 supra.
114. Id.
115. Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, 86 Wn. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975).
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of damage limitation provisions was a relevant factor in determining
unconscionability." 6 As discussed below, this requirement of conspic-
uousness is significant when considering the Magnuson-Moss Act's
effects on Washington's consequential damage provisions.
B. The Act's Provisions on Consequential Damages
Certain language of the Act could give the impression that a war-
rantor need only meet state requirements to properly limit consequen-
tial damages. 117 The provisions of the Act, however, do add to state
law, and a Washington warrantor cannot rely entirely on state provi-
sions in attempting to limit consequential damages where a written
warranty is given.
Section 104(a)(3), governing "full" warranty standards, allows a
limitation on consequential damages only if such limitation appears
conspicuously on the face of the warranty. 1 8 In addition, although
the general disclosure requirements of section 102,119 covering both
"full" and "limited" warranties, contain no specific references to con-
spicuous disclosure of damage limitations, the implementing rule for
that section clearly requires disclosure in a conspicuous manner, and
in addition requires a caveat that some states may not allow such pro-
visions.1 20
Thus, both the Act and the implementing rule contain a disclosure
requirement not included in the Washington U.C.C. provision, with
the result that a written warrantor in Washington must prominently
116. Although Schroeder involved a purely commercial as opposed to consumer
transaction, the court relied upon and approved the public policy behind two consumer
cases: Berg v. Stromme. 79 Wn. 2d 184, 484 P.2d 380 (1971). see notes 75-78 and
accompanying text supra, and Baker v. Seattle, 79 Wn. 2d 198. 484 P.2d 405 (1971).
Baker held that a limitation of consequential damages must be conspicuous. Implicit
in the Schroeder court's application of the conspicuousness requirement to a commer-
cial transaction was that it is also an important factor in determining unconscionability
in the consumer setting.
117. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 111(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(2) (Supp.
V 1975) provides:
Nothing in this chapter (other than sections 2308 and 2304 (a) (2) and (4))
shall (A) affect the liability of. or impose liability on. any person for personal
injury, or (B) supersede any provision of State law regarding consequential dam-
ages for injury to the person or other injury.
118. "[Sluch warrantor may not exclude or limit consequential damages for
breach of any written or implied warranty on such product, unless such exclusion or
limitation conspicuously appears on the face of the warranty." Id. § 104(a)(3). 15
U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3).
119. Id. § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 2302, quoted at note 8 supra.
120. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(8) (1976), quoted at note 9 supra.
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disclose the details of any limitation of consequential damages on the
face of the warranty.121 This requirement of conspicuous disclosure is
of additional importance to Washington warrantors. Because conspic-
uousness is apparently a significant factor in avoiding an unconscion-
able limitation of damages, 122 a warrantor who meets the require-
ments of the Act also satisfies an element in the determination of
conscionability.' 23 Furthermore, the provisions of the Act and
implementing rules requiring availability of written warranty terms
prior to sale will add to the conspicuousness of warranty provisions, as
well as make them common knowledge. 24
VI. A NEW CAUSE OF ACTION
Because a consumer desiring to sue for breach of warranty is not
required to bring his or her action under the Act, the conventional
Washington statutory provisions remain to enforce such obliga-
tions.125 More significant, however, are the new opportunities for con-
sumer redress provided by the Act. Section 1 10(d)(1) provides that a
consumer may sue in either state or federal court for a warrantor's
failure to meet the obligations of the Act under a service contract,
written warranty, or implied warranty.126 Perhaps most significant is
the cause of action for breach of implied warranty which may now be
121. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 104(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3)
(Supp. V 1975), quoted at note 118 supra; 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(8) (1976), quoted at
note 9 supra.
122. See notes 114-16 and accompanying text supra.
123. The implementing rule, however, requires that a long list of items be con-
spicuously disclosed in a single document. Perhaps no single item in such a list would
be conspicuous to the Washington courts. See 16 C.F.R. § 701.3 (1976), quoted at
note 9 supra.
124. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 102(b)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)
(A) (Supp. V 1975); 16 C.F.R. § 702 (1976). This rule requires sellers to make war-
ranties available for consumer inspection prior to sale. For example, warranties must
be available next to the product, in a binder near the product, or on the product
package.
125. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § Ill(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. 2311(b)(1)
(Supp. V 1975), quoted at note 30 supra. It should also be remembered that a seller
is not required by the Act to give a written warranty. Id. § 102(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §
2302(b)(2).
126. Id. § I l0(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 23 10(d)(1) (Supp. V 1975) provides:
Subject to subsections (a)(3) and (e) of this section, a consumer who is dam-
aged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with
any obligation under this chapter, or under a written warranty, implied warranty,
or service contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable
relief-
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brought under the federal act. Although other language of the Act1 27
and implementing rules128 raises some doubt as to this cause of action,
the legislative history of the bill demonstrates an intent to allow re-
covery for such a breach.1 29 The Act also provides for recovery of at-
torney's fees and costs by successful plaintiffs in such actions.1 30
These provisions expand consumers' possibilities for recovery beyond
those provided by the conventional U.C.C. provisions.1 31
Although the creation of a federal cause of action and the potential
recovery of attorney's fees and costs may not comport with the
common conception of the Act, it is suggested that these provisions
will increase implied warranty litigation in Washington, as suits pre-
viously not economically feasible for plaintiffs will now be so.
(A) in any court of competent jurisdiction in any State or the District of Colum-
bia; or
(B) in an appropriate district court of the United States. subject to paragraph
(3) of this subsection.
The Act was, however, intended to be enforced primarily in state courts. See H.R.
REP. No. 1107. 93d Cong.. 2d Sess. 42 (1974) reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. News 7702. 7723-24; S. REP. No. 151. 93d Cong.. 1st Sess. 23 (1973). Note
also that the minimum jurisdictional amount for a suit in a federal district court is
$50,000. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § l10(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3) (Supp.
V 1975).
127. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 110(f). 15 U.S.C. § 2310(f) (Supp. V
1975) provides: "For purposes of this section. only the warrantor actually making a
written affirmation of fact, promise. or undertaking shall be deemed to have created a
written warranty, and any rights arising thereunder may be enforced under this section
only against such warrantor and no other person."
128. The implementing rules for disclosure of terms and presale availability of
warranties define "warrantor" as "any supplier or other person who gives or offers to
give a written warranty." deleting the Act's additional language of "or who is or may
be obligated under an implied warranty." See 16 C.F.R. §§ 701.1(g). 702.1(d) (1976):
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 101(5). 15 U.S.C. § 2301(5) (Supp. V 1975).
129. As to the Act's language in section I10(f), quoted at note 127 supra, the
legislative history indicates that the purpose of that section was to protect manufac-
turers from liability on seller's inconsistent warranties. See note 69 supra.
As to the implementing rules. note 128 supra, the intent of the FTC in deleting the
implied warranty language of the definition of "warrantor" is unclear. The Commission
may have intended to prevent (il suits based only on implied warranties. but it is pref-
erable to assume that the Commission meant that one could not sue a warrantor for
failure to comply with the Act's disclosure and labeling provisions when the warrantor's
failure to comply is based entirely upon his implied warranty obligation. Note the
distinction between this situation and a suit under the Act for breach of implied war-
ranty including attorney's fees and costs. See also Magnuson-Moss Statements, supra
note 2. at 60.170 (FTC states that the changes in the Act's definitions are "[f or the
purposes of these [labeling and disclosure] rules.").
130. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § l10(d)(2). 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (Supp.
V 1975). quoted at note 11 supra.
131. See also id. § I l0(b)-(c). 15 U.S.C. § 2310(b)-(c) (violation of the Act
constitutes violation of Federal Trade Commission Act enforceable by the Attorney
General or the FTC).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is a detailed and technical piece
of legislation and it will be some time before sellers, buyers, their rep-
resentatives, and the Federal Trade Commission master its provisions.
The problems and ambiguities discussed herein are representative of
those throughout the Act, and while the implementing rules and policy
statements of the Federal Trade Commission are a necessary step in
the full utilization of the Act, further clarification is necessary.
In addition to greater exposure to liability by not meeting the spe-
cific provisions of the Act, sellers will likely suffer a greater number of
suits by plaintiffs now allowed to recover attorney's fees and costs.
Through the increased disclosure and labeling requirements, however,
advantages will accrue to Washington warrantors, including the possi-
bility of national standardization of warranty documents, and a "ready-
made" defense to actions based upon inconspicuousness of warranty
terms and conditions.
The extensive written warranty requirements may prove to be an
increased burden, not only to warrantors but to consumers as well.
The necessity of sifting through a detailed warranty document prior to
sale, and attempting to decipher the Act's terms of art may actually
decrease "warranty shopping" rather than increase it.132
Nevertheless, additional warranty information should now be avail-
able to those willing to study it, and Washington consumers should be
better off than under the U.C.C. provisions previously governing war-
ranty documents. Although potentially weakened by the ability of
"limited" warrantors to limit the duration of implied warranties, 133
perhaps the most significant effect of the Act is to overcome those
U.C.C. provisions which allow sellers who give written warranties to
disclaim the implied warranties arising by operation of law. In con-
trast to the detailed, conflicting, and ambiguous aspects of the Mag-
nuson-Moss Warranty Act, this prohibition may well prove to be its
saving grace.
Guy Towle
132. As an example of the potential confusion created by the Act. note the follow-
ing heading on a warranty offered by a Seattle merchant-a heading which is prob-
ably within the letter of the law. albeit not within the spirit: "100% UNCONDI-
TIONALLY GUARANTEED GOLD SEAL LIMITED WARRANTY." Document
on file at the offices of Washington Law Review.
133. See notes 83-88 and text accompanying supra.
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